



**ITU
MUN**

EUROPEAN COUNCIL

STUDY GUIDE

-Proposal of Bosnia's and Moldova's membership to EU and its possible effects on possible applications of neighboring countries to EU

-Effects of extreme amount of migration on economic and socio-cultural matters in EU participant countries

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Letter from the Secretary General

Most esteemed participants of ITUMUN24,

I, as the Secretary General of ITUMUN24, welcome you all to the 7th edition of Istanbul Technical University Model United Nations. It is an honor and a pleasure to be able to present to you what we have been preparing for months and dreaming for years. My team has worked tirelessly to bring the best you have ever seen, starting with our organization to our academics.

Our objective is to facilitate proficient and elevated diplomatic deliberations, fostering valuable and constructive solutions throughout the four-day duration of ITUMUN, enriched by the collective contributions of all participants. As a delegate, your journey begins here, with the study guide prepared by our dedicated members; your most honorable chairboard.

I advise you to read this study guide thoroughly and expand your research on different perspectives; focusing on your allocated country. It is essential to bear in mind that each nation and every perspective holds significance if you are adequately prepared to engage with the agenda at hand.

You have my best wishes for success and enriching discussions during these four days of enjoyment. I eagerly anticipate witnessing the valuable contributions you'll make to our conference.

Best regards,

Zehra Akçay

Secretary General of ITUMUN24



Letter from the Committee Board

Greetings, esteemed delegates,

It is with immense pleasure that the Chairboard extends its warmest welcome to each and every one of you as you embark on this exciting journey into the vibrant and dynamic world of EU policy-making.

As delegates representing Member States within the European Commission, you stand at the heart of crucial decision-making processes. Your responsibility is immense, tasked with upholding the best interests of your respective nations while simultaneously seeking collective solutions to issues that transcend borders. This demanding yet rewarding role will see you grapple with intricate policy details, engage in spirited debate, and ultimately forge compromises that contribute to a stronger, more unified Europe.

This study guide serves as your invaluable compass as you navigate the intricate landscape of the Commission. Within its pages, you will find comprehensive information about the EU's institutional structure, key policy areas, current challenges, and potential solutions. Dive deep into these resources, engage in lively discussions with your fellow delegates, and hone your skills in negotiation, consensus-building, and persuasive argumentation.

The Chairboard stands ready to support and guide you throughout this dynamic journey. We encourage you to approach the simulation with enthusiasm, dedication, and a willingness to learn and grow. Embrace the challenges, celebrate the triumphs, and most importantly, enjoy the unique experience of stepping into the shoes of EU policymakers. We have no doubt that your passion, intellect, and collaborative spirit will lead to a truly enriching and unforgettable simulation.

On behalf of the Chairboard, we wish you all the very best for a productive and rewarding experience in the European Commission simulation and of course, in ITUMUN!

With anticipation and excitement,
Yiğitcan Değişme & Ümit Tosunoğlu
ITUMUN24 European Council Committee Board



Introduction to the Agenda Item A

The European Union, a sprawling experiment in supranational cooperation, stands as a testament to the power of collaboration and shared values. From its humble beginnings to a complex political and economic bloc, the EU has reshaped economies and fostered a unique brand of regional identity. At the heart of this ambitious project lies the concept of membership, a dynamic interplay between individual states and the collective European ideal.

It should be underlined that membership in the EU offers undeniable benefits. A single market, encompassing hundreds of millions of consumers, has spurred economic growth and facilitated the free flow of goods and services. Open borders have granted citizens unparalleled freedom of movement, fostering cultural exchange and educational opportunities. Shared currency, environmental regulations, and foreign policy coordination have cemented the EU's position as a global player, wielding significant influence on the world stage. For smaller, previously marginalized nations, membership offers a sense of security and stability, a shield against geopolitical and economic pressures. However, the path to membership is not always smooth. The EU demands adherence to a stringent set of criteria, encompassing political and economic principles like democracy, rule of law, and market freedom. Fulfilling those criteria is a lengthy process, a process that Bosnia and Moldova are currently in.

Moldova, a little country tucked between Romania and Ukraine, has set out on a rapid path to join Europe. Significant advancements have been made in the last few years. The political landscape has been overtaken by anti-corruption movements that have strengthened democratic institutions and the rule of law. Economic changes have created the foundation for a more stable future, albeit undoubtedly encountering obstacles. Due to its determination, Moldova was recognized as a formal candidate in June 2022, and in November 2023, accession talks were swiftly commenced. This quick advancement is indicative of Moldova's will to abide by EU norms and ideals.

In the Balkans, Bosnia and Herzegovina is another story. The internal divisions in Bosnia are a significant barrier. Rooted in the wounds from previous wars, ethnic tensions obstruct agreement and swift action. EU aspirations become unfulfilled when political maneuvering frequently takes precedence over real reform. Bosnia has to heal these internal divisions and create a common future vision in order to open the door to Europe. For Bosnia to persuade the EU that it is ready for integration, it must demonstrate a stronger political will and a fresh commitment to reconciliation.

Key Vocabulary

- Accession: The process of becoming a member of the European Union.
- Candidate Country: A country that has formally applied for EU membership and is engaged in the accession process.
- Copenhagen Criteria: The three main sets of requirements (political, economic, and administrative) that candidate countries must meet to join the EU.
- Accession Negotiations: The formal talks between the EU and a candidate country to define the terms and conditions of membership.
- Acquis communautaire: The entire body of EU law, regulations, and policies that candidate countries must adopt and implement.
- Eurozone: The group of EU member states that have adopted the euro as their currency.
- Schengen Area: The group of EU member states that have abolished border controls between each other.
- Eastern Partnership: An initiative that promotes political and economic cooperation between the EU and six Eastern European countries, including Moldova and Ukraine.
- Pro-Europeanism: Support for Moldova's integration with the EU and its values.
- Oligarchy: A small group of people with excessive power and influence in the government.
- Transnistria: A breakaway region in eastern Moldova with unrecognized independence.
- Association Agreement: A trade and cooperation agreement between Moldova and the EU.
- Dayton Agreement: The peace agreement that ended the Bosnian War in 1995.
- Constituent nations: The three main ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs) that share power in Bosnia according to the Dayton Agreement.
- Entity: The two administrative units (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska) that make up Bosnia.
- General Framework Agreement for Peace: A 1995 agreement that provides the overall framework for the Dayton Agreement.
- Accession fatigue: Public skepticism or opposition in existing EU member states towards further enlargement.
- Geopolitics: The study of the impact of geography on international relations, particularly relevant in the context of EU enlargement and Russia's influence in the region.
- Conditionality: The principle that EU assistance and cooperation are linked to candidate countries' progress in meeting accession requirements.
- Civil society: The non-governmental organizations and associations that represent the interests of citizens in the political process.

Focused Overview

The European Union's eastward growth has reached an important junction, with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Moldova standing at the threshold of potential membership. Both nations, nestled amidst the historical and cultural tapestry of Eastern Europe, harbor aspirations of joining the bloc's ranks, but their paths diverge in terms of progress and challenges. Thus, The European Union (EU) membership status of Bosnia and Moldova has been a subject of extensive research and analysis.

In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the path paved to EU integration is fraught with the complexities of its unique political structure and the lingering scars of ethnic divisions. The country's unique tripartite presidency, representing Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, often grapples with internal discord which makes swift implementation of reforms demanded by the EU impossible. Additionally, as Dudley & Saez (2022) mentioned, while the EU's accession criteria have promoted democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, Bosnia has lagged behind in its efforts to achieve EU accession. Yet, a glimmer of hope lies in the recent European Commission's recommendation to open accession talks, albeit contingent on addressing outstanding issues like electoral reform and judicial independence.

In Moldova meanwhile, a different picture presents itself. The country has made significant strides in recent years, enacting anti-corruption measures and bolstering its democratic institutions. The European Commission has enthusiastically endorsed Moldova's candidacy, paving the way for the official start of accession negotiations. However, as Tkachuk (2023) emphasizes, the nation's fragile economy and lingering separatist tensions in the breakaway region of Transnistria cast a shadow over its European dream.

EU & Integration Process

Fundamentals of EU

The European Union (EU) is a cornerstone of modern Europe, its seven-decade journey has been marked by both amazing accomplishments and complex obstacles, a continual process aimed at achieving a "ever-closer union" among its member nations. The integration effort began in the aftermath of WWII, motivated by a desire for peace and economic cooperation. The Treaty of Paris (1951), which established the *European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)*, was an essential initial step. This supranational authority pooled



coal and steel resources, avoiding their use in future conflicts and encouraging economic interdependence.

The success of the ECSC prepared the way for subsequent treaties, including the establishment of the *European Economic Community (EEC)* in 1957. The EEC established a common market, removing trade obstacles and allowing for the free flow of commodities, services, and capital. This economic integration fuelled prosperity and interdependence, establishing the groundwork for the single market we have today.

The integration process went beyond just economic issues. *The 1986 Single European Act* established steps for greater political cooperation, while the *Maastricht Treaty* of 1993 formed the European Union as we know it, embracing fields such as common foreign and security policy, justice and home affairs, and a single currency, the euro.

The EU continuously expanded its reach by welcoming new member states from both Western and Eastern Europe. In 2004, after a long but fruitful normalization period with the former Soviet influenced hemisphere, the EU accepted former Soviet nations such as Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania and Poland. This cultural and social integration fostered exchange and collaboration, promoting diversity and a shared European identity.

In our present day, the EU is still ready to welcome new member states into the union as long as they fulfill necessary prerequisites and conditions representing the commitment and will of the country to democracy, fairness and prosperity. Though they are in different stages of the acceptance process, today some of the countries such as: Turkey, Bosnia, Moldova, Serbia and Georgia are in candidate status to the EU.

Bosnia and Herzegovina & EU

Bosnia and Herzegovina aspires to become an EU member state, and this ambition has been a focal point in various academic discussions. Kappler and Richmond (2011) claims, the EU's peacebuilding mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a topic of interest, with a call for a more contextualized engagement with local society

Dudley & Saez (2022) marks that Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has underperformed in its ambitions to join the EU. Unlike other former Yugoslav republics that have either joined the EU or are in the process of joining, Bosnia and Herzegovina has yet to complete key political changes on its path to democratic transition and consolidation in order to be recognized as an EU candidate country. The question is why the EU's membership requirements have failed to align BiH's democratic reforms with those of other former Yugoslav states. We contend that the incompatibility of EU-driven reforms and the structure

of BiH's postwar arrangement have slowed the country's progress and hampered its chances for EU membership.

The Bosnian conflict of the 1990s resulted in the establishment of a decentralized state system that would maintain the state's integrity through power-sharing mechanisms while giving each of the three constituent peoples significant autonomy. While this structure was designed to reconcile wartime divisions, it also legitimized internal dissension and allowed ethnic issues to remain dominant in the country's postwar political agenda. With each side continuing to question the legitimacy of the state, the incentives to develop democratic institutions have been eclipsed by each ethnic group's concerns about the other group's future intentions.

In this atmosphere of challenged authority, the EU's calls for political change have been ineffective. Specifically, while formally accepting BiH's decentralized system, the EU's reform demands centered on an institutional restructuring that would grant state institutions power over the entities, coordinate policies among the entities, and standardize legislation throughout the country. If adopted, these measures would jeopardize the very arrangement that has kept the country together since the 1990s wars, and their prospects have exacerbated the already high level of inter-ethnic hostility. As a result, while there is widespread agreement in the country about the importance of a democratic transition and international integration, any significant progress has been hampered by ongoing challenges to the legitimacy of the state, as well as uncertainty about what such integration would entail for the current socio-political arrangement and each ethnic group's ability to regulate its own affairs.

Bosnia and Herzegovina & Post-War Structure

After proclaiming independence from the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina endured a war that divided its three constituent peoples, the Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, against each other. The nearly four-year conflict came to an end in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 when the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP, often known as the Dayton Peace Agreement, 1995) was signed. The Dayton Agreement, shaped largely by the international community, constituted a sophisticated attempt to balance the need to preserve BiH's unity with the need to ensure that the three previous hostile factions could coexist. According to Holbrooke, who represented the United States in the peace process, finding an arrangement that would allow the three sides to coexist within the boundaries of one state was difficult, but preserving a unified multiethnic state while not legitimizing Serb aggression and ethnic cleansing was also necessary. To achieve both goals, the international community developed a political framework based on decentralization and power-sharing.

BiH's post-war political arrangement was in large part founded on the idea of consociationalism, which is advantageous for diverse societies. Heterogeneous societies,



especially those without cross-cutting cleavages, establish political structures that, would include all groups at the highest levels of In the decision-making process, minority groups are allowed to veto decisions of vital interest, proportionally distribute resources and positions, and permit each side to make autonomous decisions on issues in the ethnic groups' internal affairs. In BiH, which was in a way “a classic example of consociational settlement” this arrangement was intended to make After the war, the country reunited, alienating its constituent groups. It resulted in the country being divided into semi-autonomous states, with powers and positions distributed evenly among the three ethnic groups. To ensure sufficient autonomy for each community, the country was internally partitioned into two entities: a Serb entity named the Republika Srpska (RS) and a Bosniak-Croat state called the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), besides the autonomous district of Brcko. The Federation was envisioned as a decentralized organization of Croats and Bosniaks, with 10 cantons. Each organization has its own governing structure, which allows the constituent groups to maintain a high level of autonomy while remaining geographically separate.

The Dayton Agreement also established a complicated institutional framework in which most public offices contained representatives from all three ethnic groups and distributed power evenly among them. This is most noticeable at the state level, when all three constituent peoples are represented equally in each institution. For example, the state is led by a tripartite presidency composed of a Bosniak, a Croat, and a Serb, while the House of Peoples is made up of five representatives from each ethnicity. Although created with the intention of providing equal representation to each of the three groups and making a severely divided society governable, this arrangement essentially guaranteed deadlock by requiring a three-sided consensus for every issue.

In addition to the challenges caused by the requirement for a three-sided consensus, Bosnia and Herzegovina's postwar constitution deprives the state government of the majority of the political authority that central governments typically hold. According to the peace accord, the central government's jurisdiction was limited to only ten policy areas (for example, foreign policy, customs policy, and air traffic control), with the majority of other sectors given to the entities to handle. This intentionally weak government was in line with the international community's desire to give each group significant autonomy, but it resulted in a perpetual gridlock that required heavy-handed intervention from the international community to achieve any reforms. Specifically, the Dayton agreement provided international agencies with direct control of the peace pact's execution. While the military aspects of the accord were initially assigned to a NATO-led military Implementation Force, civilian elements of the treaty were executed by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation. These were in charge of implementing the treaty (General Framework Agreement, 1995). The lack of consensus, as well as the difficulty of the three constituent parties to reach an agreement on the majority of problems, resulted in the OHR's ongoing engagement in decision-making. In fact, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) regularly directed the High Representative to take command of the decision-making process and impose decisions if BiH's political elites could not reach

an agreement. Faced with recalcitrant political elites, the OHR enforced decisions on delicate matters such as national symbols and citizenship laws; it repealed legislation that violated the state constitution, removed officials from authority, and so on.

This complex institutional framework has been the source of both stability and stalemate. The relative autonomy of the three sides has helped the country to maintain harmonious ties while avoiding internal instability that could jeopardize the country's peace and stability. The underlying logic of the consociational arrangement has succeeded in achieving its goal: the three sides have been able to govern their business and protect their self-rule thanks to institutional frameworks that allow them to maintain relative independence. At the same time, the weak central administration and equal distribution of political offices among the three constituent peoples have hampered real change and democratization of the system. With each side prioritizing its narrow interests, the decisions focus on reaching the lowest common denominator, and any attempts at substantial reform are hindered by internal divides and conflicts.

Bosnia and Herzegovina & Reforms

The lack of progress in integration efforts, as well as the country's inability (or unwillingness) to meet the EU's standards, are the result of BiH's internal divisions, which are formalized in its constitution. The decentralized governing structure with a weak central authority, the blurred and overlapping competencies among different levels of government, the presence of blocking mechanisms to protect each group's interests, and ethnicity- and entity-based voting and public office distribution have all created conditions in which the state cannot act as a single unit. This division-reinforcing structure has not only hampered major reforms, but has also hampered the country's capacity to complete even simple tasks like agreeing on how to respond to all of the questions in the European Commission's questionnaire (2019b). Given that Bosnia and Herzegovina's current convoluted constitutional framework of overlapping competences hinders it from acting as a unified state, the EU has insisted on a more centralized state structure with political authority increasingly concentrated at the central level since the start of negotiations. In one of its earlier assessments of Bosnia and Herzegovina's political situation, the European Commission emphasized the importance of Bosnian politicians taking charge of their country's governing process, "as only coherent, functioning states can successfully negotiate an agreement with the EU" (European Commission, 2003:14). However, the EU's approach has hampered the country's ability to implement meaningful reforms, as any attempt to increase the central government's competencies or affect each group's level of influence in the decision-making process jeopardizes the autonomy of the three constituent groups, as well as the sense of safety each has as a result of its autonomy. As a result, the country has been considerably more likely to embrace economic and political reforms that do not jeopardize existing inter-ethnic power dynamics, while being far less willing to execute reforms that endanger the current consociational setup. While ostensibly accepting BiH's decentralized

structure, the EU has frequently demanded modifications to the country's current power-sharing arrangement. Although both groups have attempted to alter their legislation to meet EU criteria, the major barrier remains at the state level. The EU is deeply concerned about the lack of clarity regarding competencies and the ongoing uncoordinated approaches to policy making between the state-level legislative assembly, the entity parliaments, and the state-level Council of Ministers. The Commission has advocated for increased coordination between them in order for BiH to align its legislation with those of the EU. However, meaningful political reforms to address these issues would conflict with the current constitutional framework, necessitate a restructuring of the power-sharing system, and reduce the autonomy of the three ethnic groups to govern their own affairs. As a result, the EU's demands for a clear delineation of competences, as well as the creation of a clause allowing the state to "temporarily exercise competences of other levels of government to prevent serious breach of EU law" (European Commission, 2019a:13), have yielded little tangible results.

Bosnia and Herzegovina & EU Support

BiH's ongoing resistance to changes contrasts with its general support for European integration. Bosnian citizens have consistently expressed an interest in EU entry and the democratic reforms that it entails. Positive attitudes toward EU membership have consistently improved since 2015, with over 70% of the population remaining in support of entry (National Democratic Institute, 2019; Outbox Consulting, 2019). Bosnian Serbs have been the most dubious of the EU and its implications on the country, believing that EU membership "could jeopardize the existence of the RS". Despite this mistrust, the Gallup Balkan Monitor (2010,:11) data reveal that respondents in the RS began to regard EU accession as a more positive matter between 2008 and 2010. More recent surveys show that Bosnian Serbs strongly support EU membership (National Democratic Institute, 2018, 2019).

Bosnians' public support for European integration creates a paradox: they want to join the EU while still preserving the current decentralized decision-making process, which must be changed to fulfill EU standards. These contradictions are evident in public officials' conflicting comments and behavior. Republika Srpska has occasionally believed that its Serbian identity has been unfairly endangered by both BiH authorities and EU-proposed changes, such as the European Union Police Mission's attempts at police reform in the early 2000s. As a result, Milorad Dodik, the chair of BiH's tripartite presidency, revived threats to secede from the Republika Srpska in February 2020, declaring that the country's political crisis would "only disappear when Bosnia disappears" (Euronews & Associated Press, 2020).

Even Bosniak and Croat politicians who have ostensibly indicated less opposition to reforms have failed to support substantive improvements. Bakir Izetbegović, a Bosniak member of the fifth and sixth BiH president, supports shifting power to the central government, despite conceding that it is not in the best interest of his compatriots. However,

he is skeptical about BiH leaders' capacity to agree on important constitutional amendments (Izetbegović, 2016). In a 2016 speech to the European Parliament, Izetbegović argued that such measures are "neither desirable nor doable at this moment." While acknowledging the "existing systemic discrimination against citizens" in Bosnia, Željko Komšić (2019a), the Croat member of the Presidency, made it clear that Bosnia would need to undergo a process of maturation in order to implement necessary reforms without major socio-political strains. There have been few indications of such maturation. As a result, progress has been unexpectedly scarce, as bundles of proposed constitutional revisions have frequently been rejected.

Republic of Moldova & EU

Moldova, a historic country noted for its undulating hills and green vineyards, has great aspirations to join the European Union (EU). This eastward-looking country sees EU membership as a golden key to a slew of advantages, ranging from economic growth and political stability to deeper European integration and recognition.

The potential benefits of EU membership are definitely appealing. Moldova's suffering economy stands to benefit greatly from access to the EU's enormous single market, increased trade opportunities, and potential foreign investment. Aligning with the EU's democratic values and institutions promises to increase security and stability, eliminate corruption, and strengthen the rule of law. Furthermore, EU membership would enable Moldova to modernize its infrastructure, healthcare, and education systems, resulting in higher living standards and social well-being. However, the path to EU membership is not without its challenges.

Moldova's shift to a market economy has had significant political and economic ramifications. In 1992, the country experienced civil war, which led to the separation of Transnistria, resulting in a frozen conflict that has yet to be resolved. The civil war caused a recession in Moldova, leading to a drop in industrial production. The country currently has the highest unemployment rate in Europe and is among the poorest. Critics criticized the 'West' and the EU for failing to engage and support Moldova, fearing it would be overshadowed by the EU's eastward expansion and Balkan crises. In 2002-2003, the EU made a significant shift in its approach to Moldova, which was poised to become a direct neighbor following the EU's eastward expansion. Moldova joined the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004 and the Eastern Partnership framework in 2009. The EU aimed to improve relations with Moldova, promote its reforms, and share responsibility for resolving the Transnistria conflict. Despite encouraging political rhetoric, the situation in Moldova did not appear to improve. The OSCE negotiations on Transnistria were effectively stalled, leading to protests and a political crisis during the April 2009 legislative elections. The July elections drew widespread criticism for the country's democratic and human rights record.

Post War Moldova & EU

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, signed on November 28, 1994, served as the foundation for relations between the European Union (EU) and Moldova, as well as a number of other post-Soviet republics. It came into effect on July 1, 1998. The agreement was bilateral and had a 10-year period. The Agreement provided a legal and institutional basis for EU-Moldova cooperation. Simultaneously, preparatory work for the EU's largest expansion began, including attempts to determine the goals and principles for EU policy toward prospective surrounding nations such as Moldova.

Relations with Moldova received little attention in the 1990s as part of the EU's external action. The country was viewed as a peripheral territory with a small population, an unpredictable internal situation, and limited economic or transit possibilities. Nonetheless, the authorities in Chişinău (Kish-inev) began declaring their intent to join EU structures soon after the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was signed. This is supported, for example, by the Foreign Policy Concept, which was approved by the Moldovan Parliament in February 1995. It declares that "one of the Republic of Moldova's main and future foreign policy goals is the gradual accession to the European Union." The first step in this direction was the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Furthermore, in March 1999, Ion Sturza became the head of the Moldovan state government, and he proceeded to implement a program of activities under the slogan "rule of law, economic revival, European integration," thereby showing that the state had chosen a pro-European foreign policy course.

The change of government at the end of 1999, as well as the Communist Party's success in the 2001 legislative elections, impeded Moldova's Eu Integration efforts. Nonetheless, the republic joined the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe and benefited from the European Union's aid to regional countries. The pact's main objectives were, in particular, to initiate transformation in the countries of South-Eastern Europe, to shape friendly relations between the countries, and to develop economic cooperation through the implementation of the principles of a free market economy and the gradual elimination of trade barriers.

Republic of Moldova & EU Interest

The EU's interest in building relations with the Republic of Moldova has only grown as the EU's structures prepare to expand to include more European states. At the time, it was recognized that a state that was not domestically integrated (due to losing control of the Russian-backed Transnistria province) but was close to the EU's borders was critical for European security. Accordingly, Moldova was admitted to the EU's ENP. The EU Council



meeting on June 14, 2004, reiterated the EU's relevance to the republic as a neighbor and partner.

Furthermore, it was made clear that "the EU wishes to see Moldova develop into a strong and stable country with close ties to the Union based on shared democratic values, the rule of law, respect for human rights, including freedom of the media, and common interests resulting from the objectives of the European Neighbourhood Policy..." . In its conclusion, the Council urged both sides to the Transnistrian issue to continue constructive engagement on its resolution while maintaining Moldova's territorial integrity. Furthermore, it was emphasized that Moldova and Ukraine should work together more closely to manage their shared border.

Republic of Moldova & EU Support

Public opinion, the ever-changing landscape of popular mood, exposes an intriguing paradox. Polls consistently show that the majority of people support EU integration, with figures ranging from 55 to 60%. This seemingly decisive number, however, conceals deeper cracks. Young, urban populations and those living in western regions are more likely to support the European cause, enticed by the promise of economic opportunity, strengthened institutions, and a stronger foothold within a values-based society. Older generations and rural inhabitants, on the other hand, frequently feel a nostalgic affinity to Russia, which is fostered by historical links and linguistic similarities. Furthermore, the prospect of corruption and ingrained political instability raises doubt on Moldova's capacity to meet the stringent requirements for EU membership.

The appeal of joining Europe stems from a tremendous combination of desires. The dazzling mirage of economic gains shines brightest, with access to the single market and prospective foreign investment promising expanded trade, higher living standards, and a chance to escape the grips of post-Soviet economic stagnation. Beyond the visible, however, is the promise of sound administration. For many, EU integration offers a beacon of hope in the fight against pervasive corruption, as well as a catalyst for institutional improvement and the preservation of democratic ideals. The security blanket afforded by Europe is also quite appealing, especially in light of Russia's war in Ukraine, which has left a lengthy shadow of uncertainty over the region.

EU Membership Aspirations

The EU's enlargement and the addition of nations from the former communist bloc have been led by a set of membership criteria adopted at a European Council meeting in 1993. The leaders of EU member states agreed that governments seeking to join the union must be democratic, have a functioning free market economy, and align their legislation and practices with EU norms (European Council, 1993). The Commission has since used this wide framework to prepare and assess prospective members' readiness for EU membership.

Potential members first go through an association process that focuses on political and economic conditions and assesses countries' readiness to begin working on the *acquis*; once basic political and economic reforms are completed, countries are granted candidate status and begin the accession process.

The Western Balkans countries have faced additional requirements outlined in stabilization and association agreements, which, in addition to political and economic terms, require them to stabilize regional relations and cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The association process has been particularly difficult in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is the only western Balkan country save Kosovo that has yet to attain candidate status.

Lastly, to give an example case, Although Bosnia and Herzegovina was designated as a potential EU candidate country as early as 2003 (Council of the European Union, 2003; European Council, 2003), little progress has been made in its accession process to date. In a 2003 feasibility study, the European Commission outlined major measures required for Bosnia and Herzegovina to prepare for a stabilization and association agreement (SAA) with the EU. While acknowledging that BiH's constitution formally established a democratic framework, the Commission identified a number of deficiencies in the country's governance, human rights practices, and judiciary, recognizing the long road ahead before BiH can enter into a stabilization agreement. Although SAA discussions began in November 2005 and the agreement was completed in 2008, it did not go into effect until 2015 (European Union, 2015), a full decade after they had begun. BiH applied for EU membership in early 2016, but has yet to be designated as a candidate country.

Questions To Be Answered

- What are the unique challenges Bosnia faces in its EU accession bid, particularly related to its political system and internal divisions?
- What role can the international community play in supporting Bosnia's EU integration process?
- How will EU membership affect the political landscape in both Moldova and Bosnia?
- What are the potential economic benefits and challenges for both countries upon joining the EU?
- How will EU membership impact existing trade agreements and economic ties with other countries, particularly Russia for Moldova?
- What is the public sentiment in both Moldova and Bosnia regarding EU membership?
- What are the specific criteria Moldova needs to fulfill to open accession negotiations with the EU? (Copenhagen criteria, reforms, rule of law etc.)
- How has the recent war in Ukraine impacted Moldova's EU accession?
- What are the potential challenges and benefits of EU membership for Moldova?
- Should the EU consider alternative membership models for countries like Bosnia with unique challenges?
- Can Bosnia overcome complex power-sharing arrangements and internal divisions to achieve meaningful progress towards EU membership? What role does the Dayton Agreement play in this process?
- Can Moldova's fragile economy withstand the challenges of aligning with EU standards and regulations? How can the EU incentivize and support sustainable economic development in Moldova?
- How do pro-European and pro-Russian factions influence Moldova's EU aspirations? Can political instability within Moldova jeopardize its accession hopes?
- What are the potential security implications of EU expansion in the Balkans, considering regional instability and tensions? How can the EU ensure peace and stability in the region as Bosnia works towards EU membership?

Further Readings.

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Committee : European Council

Agenda Item B : Effects of extreme amount of migration on economic and socio-cultural matters in EU participant countries

Introduction to the Agenda Item B

Institutions within the European Union have acknowledged the advantages of proactive and realistic immigration policies. They are also aware that these won't be effective without the socioeconomic, civic, and political integration of immigrants. After decades of settlement, some migrants experience economic and social disadvantages, are barred from civic and political life, and experience racism and prejudice as well as xenophobia. Because of their marginalization, far-right parties find them to be convenient scapegoats, which have increased in popularity across Europe by stirring up hatred and taking advantage of anxieties. People's perceptions of immigrants often deteriorate, particularly when social aid programs are implemented. Return and isolation becomes a genuine danger for a lot of people. Population group polarization that follows indicates a pattern of societal fragmentation. The challenges of managing differences and appreciating variety seem especially great when economic, social, and even bodily fears are present.

European policymakers are under growing pressure to embrace more successful strategies for safe and secure inclusion, but they are unsure of how to unite people in order to make this happen. In light of this, the European Commission has urged political leadership to foster acceptance of diversity and bridge societal divides. It has emphasized that, in order to maintain social cohesion, integration policies that uphold equality and diversity must be put into place. These policies must be founded in the understanding that European society is pluralistic.

The rich diversity of unique religious, cultural, and social traditions that each of the Member States of the European Union has to offer serves as the foundation for this union. People from a wide variety of racial, ethnic, religious, and national backgrounds live there, and the contributions of immigrants from all over the world have enhanced both its economy and cultures. Migration flows will continue to influence European society and create connections with sending communities around the globe in an increasingly globalized environment. Alongside these advancements, Europe's languages, cultural norms, and demography will change, and its citizens will constantly need to adapt. The majority of adaptation has already been accomplished by migrants themselves, who established businesses, grew roots, and constructed houses in EU member states that haven't always welcomed them with open arms.



Key Vocabulary

- Push and Pull Factors: Reasons driving emigration from sending countries and immigration to receiving countries.
- Demographic Transition: Changes in population growth, fertility, and mortality rates as affected by migration.
- Labor Market: Impact of migration on wages, unemployment, skills gaps, and sectoral shifts.
- Fiscal Impact: Costs and benefits of migration on public finances, including social security, education, and healthcare.
- Economic Growth: Contribution of migrants to GDP, innovation, and entrepreneurship.
- Brain Drain: Potential loss of skilled professionals from developing countries due to migration.
- Informal Economy: Participation of migrants in the informal sector and its implications for tax revenue and labor rights.
- Integration and Assimilation: Processes of migrants adapting to the host society and their cultural characteristics.
- Social Cohesion: Sense of unity and solidarity within a society, potentially challenged by large-scale migration.
- Multiculturalism and Interculturalism: Approaches to managing cultural diversity in diverse societies.
- Xenophobia and Anti-immigrant Sentiment: Negative attitudes towards migrants and potential discrimination.
- Social Capital: Networks of trust and reciprocity within communities, impacted by migration flows.
- Cultural Exchange and Innovation: Cross-cultural sharing of traditions, customs, and ideas leading to societal enrichment.
- Religious Diversity and Secularism: Challenges of accommodating diverse religious practices in secular societies.
- Identity and Belonging: Feeling of belonging to a particular group or society, affected by migration experiences.
- EU Migration Policy: Schengen Agreement, Dublin Regulation, Common European Asylum System, resettlement quotas.
- Integration Policies: Language training, education, employment support, anti-discrimination measures.
- Border Control and Security: Measures to manage irregular migration and ensure national security.
- Development Cooperation: Addressing root causes of migration through cooperation with sending countries.
- Externalization of Borders: Cooperation with third countries to control migration flows before reaching EU borders.
- Return and Readmission Agreements: Agreements with third countries for the return of irregular migrants.
- Human Rights and Rule of Law: Importance of upholding human rights and the rule of law in migration governance.
- Migrant: A person who moves away from their place of usual residence, either within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons (see subcategories below).

- Refugee: A person fleeing persecution, war, or violence who seeks refuge in another country and meets the definition of the 1951 Refugee Convention.
- Asylum Seeker: An individual claiming a well-founded fear of persecution in their home country and seeking international protection through a formal asylum process.

Focused Overview

The EU's economies and cultures are facing more and more issues as a result of the growing number of forced migrants from Middle Eastern civil conflict zones. For the first time since World War II, the number of asylum seekers in the EU topped one million annually in 2015 and 2016. Receiving nations face increasing issues as a result of these massive refugee arrivals. The goal of the current study is to evaluate the anticipated long-term social, economic, and budgetary impacts of the rapidly rising immigration of forced civil war refugees into the EU and to determine what part active policy may play in facilitating the integration of refugees into the workforce.

The humanitarian argument is most frequently made when discussing refugees. However, forced migration from civil wars also presents significant social and financial issues and may present business opportunities for EU economies. On the one hand, the social-beneficiary status quo of asylum seekers, which offers them welfare benefits and the required access to language, education, and social infrastructure, may, in the short term, raise the expenses of Member States' budgets. However, integrating authorized asylum seekers into the EU labor market may eventually lead to financial and economic benefits in addition to social ones. Furthermore, integrated refugees can be crucial in addressing Europe's grave demographic issues, increasing employment and growth within the EU, improving the ratio of economically active to inactive people—a ratio that is declining in many Member States—and filling positions requiring specialized skill sets.

Numerous recent studies have looked into the possible effects of migrant integration into the labor markets of destination countries. The literature generally agrees that there are compelling reasons to predict positive impacts on labor markets when immigrants bring talents that are in short supply in recipient countries. For instance, Ottaviano and Peri (2012) demonstrate that the general equilibrium effects of immigration on the labor markets of receiving countries heavily rely on the degree to which immigrants and foreign workers are complementary or substitutable. In keeping with this, Peri (2016) also affirms that considerations such as the complementarity and substitutability of native-born workers and immigrants in the workforce, as well as the receiving economies' response through technological choices and specialization, are critical in determining the overall equilibrium effects of immigration.

Immigration under duress in the EU

Asylum Seekers Flow into the EU

Asylum seekers have traditionally been welcomed into EU member states. Although the number of applications for asylum seekers in the EU has increased on several occasions in the past—for instance, a relatively high number of applications (672 thousand) were received in 1992, mostly from the former Yugoslavia—2015 marked the first year that the total number of applications for asylum in the EU exceeded one million in a single year (see Figure 1). Furthermore, a large number of asylum seekers and refugees may arrive in Europe in the upcoming years, according to IOM (2017).




Figure 1: Dynamics of asylum applications in the EU-28 Member States during 2008-2016, thousands. Source: Eurostat

Figure 1 shows that, up until 2013, the number of first-time asylum seekers in the EU was less than 500,000 a year, averaging roughly 300,000 between 2009 and 2016. In the EU, the number of people applying for asylum for the first time more than doubled, from 563 thousand in 2014 to nearly 1.26 million in 2015. Additionally, in 2016, there were far more asylum seekers in the EU than there were in 2015 (Figure 1)

Finland (about ten times higher in 2015 compared to 2014), Hungary (about five times higher), and Austria (more than three times higher) saw the biggest increases in the number of first-time asylum applicants, expressed as a share of the total population. According to Eurostat (2016), the number of German citizens applying for asylum for the first time jumped from 173,000 in 2014 to 442,000 in 2015. Additionally, between 2014 and 2015, there were notable increases in first-time asylum applications in Hungary, Sweden, and Austria. Conversely, very few asylum seekers were recorded in 2014 or 2015 in the majority of EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe, such as the Czech Republic, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, and Romania. This suggests that there are considerable disparities throughout EU Member States in terms of population share and the number of people applying for asylum for the first time. As a result, we account for these differences in our calculations of country-specific costs and labor supply increases.

Socio-Economic Situation of Migrants in the EU

Although refugees are accepted to live in almost all EU member states, their standard of life is lower than that of the native-born people. The European Union (2015) reports that immigrants' socioeconomic circumstances in EU Member States are poorer than those of native-born people in a number of areas, most notably work and education. The most urgent issues surrounding the integration of immigrants into the EU are summed up in the European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals (European Commission, 2011):

- ◆ Gaps in educational attainment
- ◆ Low employment rates among migrants, particularly among women
- ◆ "Brain waste" and high rates of "over-qualification"
- ◆ High risks of poverty and social marginalization

Evidence from previous studies (EU, 2015, for example) indicates that students from third countries still encounter more obstacles in the educational system than those who were born there. Therefore, low levels of education not only contribute to the poverty and social marginalization of refugees but also pose a serious risk to the economy of Member States. The latter has frequently been disregarded in political discourse due to a lack of adequate scientific data.

Social fairness is the most frequently used justification by policy makers for increasing funding for immigrant children's education. On the other hand, there can be a sound financial justification for this investment as well.

Furthermore, compared to native-born people, immigrants with higher education degrees have more difficulty obtaining high-skill occupations. Because of this, a large

number of immigrants work in low-skilled occupations in spite of holding professional degrees, are overqualified for low-skilled professions, or have less favorable working conditions than workers who are native-born. Lastly, compared to native-born people, immigrants have greater income disparity. There are more disparities in wealth between citizens of third countries and those of the host country than there are between native-born people and foreign-born people. Additionally, compared to native households in the host nation, the poverty rate among immigrant households is significantly higher—roughly twice as high. Furthermore, even when they are employed, immigrants are more likely to experience poverty or social exclusion than citizens of the host country, and migrant children are especially vulnerable to poverty, according to the European Union (2015).

A better use of the skills that are available can be supported by international migration, which can make up for the EU's low mobility rate and boost human capital overall by improving the skill mix.

Migration can help alleviate labor shortages in certain nations, areas, industries, or professions when the EU records relatively low internal labor mobility. According to some research, immigrants can increase the ability of local differences to be adjusted to. For example, they can do this by working in fields where native-born people might not be willing to, and by being more aware of local variations in economic prospects. Migration may be a means of labor market adjustment, according to a meta-study on the effects of immigration on European labor markets. In this situation, immigrants fill labor shortages and provide valuable skills to their new nation. Numerous studies claim that immigrants bring significant abilities with them, but they also caution that their potential is frequently unrealized.

Lastly, research from the US and the EU suggests that immigrants are as responsive as or more responsive than natives of their destination countries to shortages across sectors, occupations, and regions, despite the fact that empirical data on the responsiveness of migrants to labor or skill shortages is sparse. Migration is just a partial solution to Europe's demographic problems, as the following section reports. Additional elements like making greater use of the human resources on hand might also be beneficial. Different industries have varying skill requirements, and they both grow and decline faster than the population. Furthermore, a number of business surveys have also shown significant micro-level discrepancies in the supply and demand of labor.

In light of future expansion, maintaining and increasing labor productivity depends heavily on the quality of new entrants, both in terms of education and skill sets. According to the European experience in the first ten years of the twenty-first century, migrants were responsible for 70% of the rise in the labor force overall, but only 14% of the increase in the highly educated category. Approximately 50% of low-skilled employment in the EU are held by immigrants. Consequently, there's a chance of developing a labor market that is divided, with immigrants monopolizing low-skilled jobs. Furthermore, new research reveals that the potential contribution of migrants is primarily below potential for the group of higher



educated individuals, leading to overqualification or reduced employment rates for these highly educated foreign migrants.

A joint OECD-EC research from 2014 made clear that, in the long run, skill mismatches will probably be more significant for potential growth than labor shortages. Within this framework, migration has the potential to positively impact productivity drivers through enhanced skill utilization, improved skill mix, and increased net accumulation of human capital. However, to do this, it will be necessary to make more use of the abilities of already-established migrants in addition to creating and managing channels for attracting new migrant workers who possess the necessary skill set.

Europe's population is aging quickly; no single factor can stop this trend, and this phenomenon affects every nation equally. Europe would have far worse demographics if there was no international migration.

Every EU member state has challenges as a result of demographic change. Overall, the population of the EU-28 is predicted to rise from 508 to 526 million by 2050 and fall to about 520 million by 2080 under the primary forecast scenario published by the EU Commission. The many scenarios presented in Figure 2 demonstrate the significant influence of life expectancy, migration, and fertility estimates on these projections. For example, if there was no net immigration from outside the EU, the population of the EU would decrease by more than 20% by the year 2080.




Figure 2: Total population (EU-28, million people) Source : Eurostat

The population of Europe will be older overall and greater. Undoubtedly, this poses a problem to the sustainability of welfare and health systems. It also poses a challenge to potential growth, as it restrains the rise of employment. Europe is not alone in facing this

challenge: Japan has seen extremely low birth rates, relatively small migrant arrivals, and a sharp rise in the ratios of economic and demographic dependence during the past 20 years. Rather, a phenomenon known as the "demographic dividend" helps nations with falling fertility rates and expanding working-age populations (WAPs, or those aged 16 to 64), most of which are in developing nations. Typically lasting 20 to 30 years, this window of opportunity accelerates the economic progress of the participating nations.

Life expectancy is still rising in the EU, and fewer babies are being born than are needed to replenish the population. The natural replacement rate, or fertility rate, which is required to maintain population stability over time is 2.1. The average for Europe right now is about 1.6, and only two nations—France and Ireland—record levels that are nearly at replacement level. In the past ten years, fertility has stabilized after decades of fall, and in certain nations, it has even climbed. Finding broad economic or cultural causes for this resurgence is challenging, though.

Fertility rates are predicted by the EUROPOP 2013 model to climb from 1.59 in 2013 to 1.68 by 2030 and then to 1.76 in 2060, which is higher than the prior 2008 estimates. But even if fertility were to rise more, this element by itself would not be enough to reverse Europe's aging trend unless it were maintained at a rate higher than 2.0 for a few decades. Age dependency as a whole is predicted to double by 2060, while the working-age population (those between the ages of 16 and 64) is predicted to shrink by 0.3% year. The working-age population will account for 44% of the overall population by 2060, down from 64% in the EUROPOP2013 prediction. This is especially important in terms of prospective growth, since the proportion of the population that is working age shows how much labor is available in relation to the whole population.

Consequences for the Population's Racial Makeup

The increase in populations of foreign descent, both European and particularly non-European, to hitherto unheard-of levels is another significant effect. Particularly with regard to non-European communities, there has been a newfound diversity of culture, language, and religion. Perceptions of distinct identities have endured among numerous minority groups well beyond the immigrant generation, in addition to residential segregation and challenges with education and workforce integration (OECD 2003, 2008). One such group is the Turks in Germany (Liebig 2007). Receiving societies must deal with issues related to politics, the constitution, education, interpersonal relationships, trust, and solidarity. It is difficult to reconcile disparities in expectations and values because the newcomers' frequently strong traditions arrived at the same time that European values—such as those pertaining to sexual equality—were developing quickly. At the same time, traditional ideas of national identity and religious faith weakened and declined for reasons unrelated to immigration.

Considering all of this, certain national statistical offices have projected the size and distribution of populations of "foreign background" or "foreign origin" in the future (i.e., immigrants and those born in the country but having one or both parents born abroad). These are condensed in another place (Coleman 2006). In order to depict significant disparities, major populations classified by national origin are projected separately and additionally clustered into larger "western" and "non-western" categories (i.e., "developed country" and "developing country," or high and low Human Development Index). In the year 2000, between one-third and half of the populations of foreign descent living in European countries were originally from Europe. Projected increases tend to be concentrated in the 'non-western' group overall. These forecasts usually include a longer-term assumption about assimilation and a shorter-term assumption regarding the preservation of ethnic demographic traits. However, after the second generation, all people of immigrant descent are considered to merge with the native population, becoming Dutch, Danish, and so on, making them statistically invisible. It could be a bit ambitious to assume that everyone would eventually be Dutch, Danish, etc. in the absence of additional immigration.

The proportion of white people in the country has unavoidably decreased as a result of those populations' continuous growth, raising the possibility that white people may eventually no longer be the majority. The US Census Bureau (2008) projects that this will happen in 2043 in the US with regard to the white non-Hispanic population. According to basic demographics, any population with sub-replacement fertility and a consistent net influx of people from abroad must eventually lose share of its total population and be replaced by that immigrant population (apart from people of mixed ancestry, who are likely to become numerous). Due to sub-replacement TFR and positive immigration, almost all western nations will experience that result until their migration or birth rates alter. The native population will endure due to replacement fertility, but its proportion of the total population will decrease as a result of ongoing migration.

By the year 2000, the percentage of people in western Europe who were of foreign descent ranged from 8% to 18%. Given the persistence of recent migrant arrivals, it is predicted that they will reach 20%–30% in 2050, with significantly larger percentages in younger cohorts and metropolitan areas. Every one of these projections conveys a similar message. Despite varying source nations of origin, the rate of increase of the population of foreign descent is linear with a comparable slope in different countries from different beginning points. According to the projections' underlying assumptions, the population of foreign descent automatically dissipates after two generations, while linear growth persists unaltered until the end of the forecast period.

History of Events

Although Europeans make up the majority of immigrant populations in European nations, many immigrants and their offspring are descended from people who left the

continent. The majority of immigrants and their descendants have ties to previous colonies in Africa, the Americas, and Asia for the former colonial powers France, Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal. Furthermore, starting in the 1960s, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Belgium hired Turkish and Moroccan guest workers; many of the present immigrants in those nations have connections to these recruitment initiatives.

In the 1980s, Moroccan immigrants also started moving in large numbers to Spain and Italy in search of employment. The majority of non-Western immigrants in the Scandinavian nations of Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland are refugees and asylum seekers from the Middle East, East Africa, and other parts of the world who have been living there since the 1980s and 1990s. Globalization has resulted in an influx of professionals, workers, and students into major European cities, particularly London, Paris, and Frankfurt. The number of competent professionals from outside the continent has expanded even more after the EU Blue Card was introduced in May 2009.

There has been illegal immigration and asylum-seeking from outside of Europe since at least the 1990s. After years of being relatively low, the number of migrants started to increase in 2013. A significant surge of asylum seekers entering from outside of Europe occurred in 2015 as a result of the European migration crisis. But the EU-Turkey agreement passed in March 2016 significantly decreased this figure, and the Italian government's anti-immigrant policies that began in 2017 further decreased illegal immigration via the Mediterranean route.


Some academics contend that worldwide disparities between wealthy and impoverished nations are to blame for the rise in migratory flows starting in the 1980s. The number of people who become citizens of a European Union member state decreased to about 825,000 in 2017 from 995,000 in 2016. The biggest populations were Moroccan, Albanian, Indian, Turkish, and Pakistani nationals. In 2017, 2.4 million non-EU immigrants joined the EU. Furthermore, migration has benefited from more improved technology and less expensive transportation.

After the Arab Spring, the EU as a whole has seen the largest refugee crisis since World War II, particularly following the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011 and the emergence of the "Islamic State" in 2013. The majority of the immigrants are Middle Eastern conflict refugees, particularly those from Syria, who present the EU with previously unseen difficulties. There are approximately 6.5 million internally displaced people, 4.4 million registered refugees, and 1.5 million undocumented immigrants since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011. The whole population of Syria is made up of half of these refugees. As of the end of 2015, there were 4.2 million Syrian refugees straying into neighboring countries and regions, followed by 2.59 million from Afghanistan and 1.1 million from Somalia. Syria has emerged as the world's largest source of refugees.



In particular, the Middle Eastern nations that ship immigrants to the European Union can be categorized as transit or country of origin: the former group includes Turkey, Libya, and Morocco, and the latter group includes mostly Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The Syrian refugee crisis has increased the demand on surrounding countries to accept refugees. Currently, there are 2.1 million Syrian refugees officially registered in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon; there are 2.2 million in Turkey; and there are 0.26 million in North Africa. The largest refugee asylum in the world is now located in Turkey.

Simultaneously, as the immigration destination for Middle Eastern refugees, the EU received 0.68 million copies of asylum applications between April 2011 and March 2016. Of these, 60% came from Germany and Sweden, 26% from Hungary, Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Bulgaria, and 13% from other countries. The two EU nations that received the most requests for asylum and refugee status were Germany and Sweden. UNHCR statistics show that the number of refugees entering the European Union area by air increased dramatically from approximately 60,000 in 2013 to 218,000 in 2014, and then doubled to 500,000 in 2015. It is anticipated that in the ensuing two years, at least 850,000 refugees will enter the EU countries via the Mediterranean, adding to the total number of refugees arriving by land, which is expected to exceed one million.






Figure 3: Migratory Routes Map

Major Parties Involved and Their Views

Germany

When the federal government appointed an integration commissioner in 1978, it was recognizing that more and more short-term guest workers were settling down in Germany long-term.

This set the stage for the government's first significant overhaul of the immigration system in 2005 and the creation of a methodical integration program at the beginning of the new millennium.

The German governments have established two integration strategies thus far to encourage the assimilation of migrants.

While the National Action Plan on Integration of 2012 developed tools to make the integration policy's outcomes quantifiable, the National Integration Plan of 2007 concentrated on education, training, employment, and cultural integration. It contained broad objectives, deadlines, and indicators to confirm that the predetermined goals were met:

- ◆ Optimizing the individualized assistance given to recent immigrants
- ◆ Enhancing the acceptance of foreign degrees raising the proportion of immigrants
- ◆ Working in federal and state civil services offering medical care and assistance to those who migrate.

Afterwards, the government's policy was defined by the Meseberg Declaration on Integration, which was approved by the federal cabinet in May 2016. It was based on the idea of giving foreigners opportunities for employment, training, and support while also emphasizing their responsibilities and demanding work in return (Fördern und Fordern).

Services are offered in a modular format, with a focus on different immigrant groups and involving nearly all federal ministries related to employment, education, and social integration.

In addition, the federal government established the Expert Commission on the Framework Conditions for Integration Capability in 2019–2021, which will deal with a variety of integration and migration-related issues. As a result, a report is produced that explains the processes at play in the field of integration, promotes the idea that integration benefits society as a whole, and offers a plethora of suggestions for how many stakeholders, including policymakers, might collaborate to better shape the immigrant community.

France

Africa accounted for 46.5% of all immigrants in 2019, followed by Europe (35.3%), Asia (14.7%), and the Americas and Oceania (5.4%). Non-EU workers' employment rates in 2020 were below 50% in France's south and southwest, above 65% in the north and northeast, and below 50% in the area of Burgundy.

The percentage of African immigrants and residents in France is rising; by 2022, 48.2% of all immigrants will have arrived from Africa, followed by 32.3% from Europe, 13.5% from Asia, and 6% from the Americas and Oceania. In 2022, non-European immigrants will make up 61.7% of all immigrants residing in France. Under the administration of Emmanuel Macron, there was a notable surge in the number of students, family reunions, and labor migration from African and Asian nations, bringing the total number of new immigrants to France above 320,000 for the first time.

According to a survey conducted in 2023 by Jean-Paul Gourévitch on behalf of the Contribuables associés association (also known as Associated Taxpayers), the anticipated annual cost of immigration to France for French taxpayers was €53.9 billion, which is four times higher than the annual budget of the Justice ministry.

Italy

The Italian National Institute of Statistics, or Istat, estimates that 8,7% of Italy's population was made up of foreigners as of the beginning of 2021. Most of them resided in the country's center-north. In descending order, Emilia-Romagna, Lombardia, Toscana, and Lazio are the four regions with the largest concentration of foreign nationals.

The Italian Government establishes the annual cap on the number of non-EU foreigners who are permitted to work in the country through the Flow decree (Decreto flussi). The order also specifies the maximum quantity of resident permits that were first issued for educational purposes and can subsequently be changed to residence permits for employment purposes.

Various kinds of labor can require various residence permits for the purpose of working. A quota for the conversion of residence permits intended for seasonal employment into non-seasonal employee permits is also included in the order.

Spain

Spain has firsthand knowledge of the significant contribution that migration can make to development. Our nation's progress was greatly aided by migration, as seen by the recent wave of emigration that thousands of Spaniards experienced in search of better chances for



employment and living abroad that were not available to them back home. Spain can draw several conclusions about the degree to which migration can aid in development from this profound migratory experience.

Spain has quickly transformed from a nation that sent people away to one that welcomes immigrants who are looking for the same chances that Spanish emigrants were seeking elsewhere not too long ago. From a vantage point that is well-versed in the issues at hand, this dual perspective allows us to approach and comprehend the worries and demands of both sides.

Spain has made an effort to turn migration into a good factor for its transit, destination, and origin nations based on its own experience. The articulation of the elements of a public, government-led migration strategy that supports development has been a major focus of Spain's contribution to the Migration and Development agenda.

Evaluation of Previous Attempts to Resolve the Issue

In EU countries, public discourse on immigration is highly politicized. Divergent viewpoints are frequently expressed by those participating in this discussion. On the one hand, proponents of more liberal immigration policies—among them economists—offer compelling justifications for why the EU requires an increase in immigration. One rationale for this is that pension systems are under pressure due to the aging of the European population. In this regard, immigration inflows are advantageous as they could decelerate the rate of aging and, as a result, ease pressures within the pension system. One more reason in favor of immigration is the low spatial mobility of European workers inside the EU. As a result of the latter, migrants enter locations where labor is in short supply, which helps to stabilize the economy after asymmetric shocks.

However, there is a strong anti-immigrant sentiment in many European nations. According to data from the European Social Survey's immigration module, as documented by Card, Dustmann, and Preston (2005), the percentage of respondents who support strict immigration laws spans from a low of 17.9% in Sweden to a high of 86.1% in Greece. Negative attitudes on immigration are mostly linked to the idea of a fiscal burden, claims Boeri (2009). Some Europeans worry that immigrants waste public funds because they are the beneficiaries of the large social transfers that were implemented in Europe to combat social marginalization. As a result, several national governments are restricting migrant access to welfare in addition to tightening up immigration laws. According to Boeri (2009), this is paradoxical. The European Union is a major supporter of policies that promote social inclusion and protection, yet these policies are turning into "weapons of mass exclusion." There are also other explanations for the large percentage of indigenous who support strict immigration laws in various nations. Native Americans worry that immigration will affect

their jobs and salaries because it would mean a transfer of wealth among the population's many subgroups. A different explanation on social capital is put out by Schiff (2002). Migration has an impact on the culture, customs, and values of the receiving nation, in contrast to the transfer of products. Some people think immigration threatens shared values, which is why they are against it.

Due to the intricacy of migration, policies must be implemented globally. First, a high degree of cooperation amongst EU member states is required due to the multiple externalities at play. This notion might be made clearer with the aid of a basic illustration. Unauthorized immigrants are permitted to travel between the member states of the Schengen area after they have gained entry. Therefore, in order to coordinate their policies on irregular immigration, EU member states must work together. The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, which was formally adopted in Brussels on October 16, 2008, emphasizes this as well as the significance of bolstering cooperation with transit and origin nations on a number of fronts, such as managing migrant inflows, combating the trafficking of people, and opposing international criminal networks

Second, as Brady (2008) points out, a comprehensive examination of every factor influencing migration is necessary for a global perspective. Policies addressing "push" factors, or the motivations behind migrants' desire to leave particular countries, include lowering trade barriers and providing official development assistance to help the countries of origin of immigrants deal with issues of political instability, poverty, or high unemployment. Immigration strategies ought to consider the pull factors—those that draw migrants to the country of destination. The state of the labor market in the host nation is one illustration of such a factor. As per the aforementioned agreement, each member state of the European Union is free to determine how many applicants it will accept, taking into account each nation's unique labor needs.

Two of the main points of contention in the debate over European immigration policy are the EU's willingness to draw in more qualified immigrants and to lower the number of undocumented immigrants, in addition to encouraging cooperation between member states and between the EU and the countries of origin of migrants.

Questions To Be Answered

What impact does a massive migration wave have on the productivity and general economic growth of EU member states?

What particular economic sectors are severely impacted by extreme migration, and what effect does this have on employment rates?

What effects does migration have on salaries, the level of competition for jobs, and the distribution of skills in the domestic labor market?

How is the demand on social services like housing, healthcare, and education in the host nations affected by the increasing population resulting from migration?

What regulations are in place to guarantee that both current residents and migrants have fair access to social services?

What effects does a high migrant population have on the social cohesion and cultural dynamics of EU member states?

What policies are in place to control and regulate migration, taking sociocultural and economic factors into account, both at the EU and national levels?

What obstacles to language, education, and cultural assimilation do migrants encounter, and how are these obstacles being overcome?

How successful are integration programs in assisting migrants in assimilating into the host society, and to what extent do they exist?

How can governments foster social cohesion and stop conflicts from escalating between various communities?

What effects does excessive migration have on security, and how do the host nations handle such issues with crime and public safety?

Given economic, cultural, and social variables, how sustainable are the existing migration trends in EU member states over the long run?

Are there any opportunities or difficulties that can be anticipated for the future? If so, what proactive measures can be taken to handle them?

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